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1. Introduction1 
Coordinating for Cohesion in the Public Sector of the Future (COCOPS), as one of the largest 
comparative public management research projects in Europe, intends to provide a comprehensive 
picture of the challenges facing the public sector in European countries and to systematically explore 
the impact of New Public Management (NPM)-style reforms in Europe. The project brings together 
public administration scholars from eleven universities in ten countries2 and is funded as part of the 
European Union’s 7th Framework Programme between January 2011 and June 2014.3 The research is 
comparative and evidence-based, drawing on both existing data and innovative new quantitative and 
qualitative data collection, at both national and policy sector levels. A cornerstone of the project is 
the COCOPS Executive Survey on Public Sector Reform in Europe: an original, large-scale survey of 
public sector top executives in ten European countries, exploring executives’ opinions and 
experiences with regards to public sector reforms in general government, as well as more particularly 
in the health and employment policy sectors. 
Scholars within the public administration discipline have long underlined the need for more 
quantitative and rigorous comparative research, going beyond single-country and single-organization 
approaches (see Derlien 1992; Fitzpatrick et al 2011; Pollitt 2011; Raadschelders and Lee 2011). 
Moreover, few research initiatives have explored in depth the transformation of public 
administrations as triggered by NPM reform discourses in a systematic comparative form (Van de 
Walle and Hammerschmid 2011). Responding to such concerns, this survey offers systematic 
evidence regarding the dynamics of public administration reform in Europe, with the goal to create 
an encompassing and systematic picture of public administration after more than two decades of 
NPM reforms. 
From a theoretical perspective the survey builds on the perception of three major reform paradigms 
(New Public Management, Public Governance and the Neo-Weberian State) as described by Pollitt 
and Bouckaert (2011). Focusing on top executives, it follows pioneering elite studies such as those of 
Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman (see Putnam 1976, Aberbach et al. 1981, and Aberbach and 
Rockman 2006), which lay the foundation for many other both national and cross-national executive 
surveys (e.g. Mayntz and Derlien 1988; Christensen and Laegreid 2007; Bertelli et al. 2007; Trondal 
2010; Bauer et al. 2009; COBRA survey; UDITE survey).  
Methodologically it also draws inspiration from cross-national population surveys such as the 
European Social Science Survey, European Values Survey, the International Social Survey Program; as 
well as from experiences with cross-national surveys such as those of the Survey Research Centre at 
the University of Michigan (2010).  
As set out by the project's terms of reference the goal of this large-scale survey is to analyse national 
administrations (both ministries and agencies) in the participating countries and also to take a closer 
look at the policy fields employment and health. The survey aims to explore public sector executives´ 
perceptions, experiences and opinions with regards to their work context and administrative 
                                                          
1 This introduction is based on Hammeschmid, Görnitz, Oprisor and Stimac (2013), and appears in the same form in all WP3 
COCOPS country reports. 
2 
Erasmus University Rotterdam, Hertie School of Governance Berlin, University of Bergen, Bocconi University, 
University of Cantabria, Cardiff University,  CNRS Paris, Corvinus University Budapest, University of Exeter, KU 
Leuven, Tallinn University of Technology 
3
 More information on the project is available at www.cocops.eu 
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reforms, but also on other factors such as values and identities and the impact of the fiscal crisis. The 
core survey implemented in all participating countries consists of 31 questions structured in four 
parts (I) General information; (II) Management and Work Practice of Your Organization; (III) Public 
Sector Reform and the Fiscal Crisis; (IV) Attitudes, Preferences and Personal Information. The survey 
is a result of the joint work of all the national research teams within the COCOPS project and under 
the leadership of a team of researchers at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin. In addition, 
further universities from other European countries were included as strategic partners to replicate 
the survey in these countries.4 
Three essential challenges connected to the design of the questionnaire and the survey methodology 
had to be handled by the research team: a sample design that would allow systematic comparative 
analyses; an access strategy to produce (statistically sufficient) high response rates; and a 
questionnaire design and translation that would assure conceptual equivalence between all 
countries. As a general principle, the survey team opted for a balanced and pragmatic approach with 
a view on a maximum of quality and comparability, while still allowing for sufficient flexibility within 
each country’s context. A core questionnaire developed by the survey team in English was translated 
into country-specific versions by the respective national research teams and – if assumed helpful – 
optional questions were added. With regards to the population definition, the research team 
targeted a group with relevant experience to assess overall developments and trends both on an 
organizational and policy field level. In general, top executives are viewed as such informants 
regarding the state of administration, given their privileged vantage point (Walker and Enticott 
2004), but also, with the blurring of the classical boundaries between politicians and civil servants 
(Aberbach et al. 1981), due to their own role in policy-making and their influence on the choice and 
implementation of reforms (Christensen and Lægreid 1999; Ridder et al. 2006). A major critique 
raised against elite surveys however (see in particular Enticott et al. 2008) is that they usually focus 
on a limited selection of individuals at the top of the organization. As these individuals are relatively 
disconnected from processes at lower levels in the organizations, and also due to issues of 
desirability, such an approach is bound to provide a biased image of the respective organization(s). 
These are important points to take into consideration when interpreting the results. 
In order to avoid random sampling and issues of representativeness, the COCOPS executive survey is 
based on a full census of all central government ministries and agencies. It covers all high level public 
sector executives who in their respective positions can be expected to be involved in public 
administration reform processes. A core set of binding sample principles, based on a detailed 
mapping of national administrative structures, was followed by all teams in all central government 
areas and especially in the case of employment and health. Deviations were only allowed if precise 
equivalence could not be established due to the specificity of administrative structures. Local 
government and service delivery levels were excluded for the purpose of this survey. Generally, 
within all central government ministries and subordinated agencies the two top-administrative levels 
were addressed; in some cases invitations were also sent to executives on the third level if, due to 
their policy relevance, this was deemed appropriate. State-owned enterprises and audit courts were 
not included due to their different task repertoire. In the fields of employment and health, as special 
                                                          
4 The Vienna University of Economics and Business for Austria, the Kaunas University of Technology for 
Lithuania, the Technical University of Lisbon for Portugal, Copenhagen Business School, the Belgrade Fund for 
Political Excellence for Serbia and the University of Bern for Switzerland 
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focus areas, regional and state government ministries and agencies were  also included if relevant – 
without addressing however direct service delivery levels (e.g. hospitals, job centers).  
Moreover, the survey explicitly covers different units of analysis (see Pollitt 2011: 121, on units of 
analysis in comparative public administration research) to allow for multi-level analyses: policy field, 
organization and individual experiences of the respondent. These are explored through the 
(self)perceptions of public sector executives, acknowledged in research as the closest channel into 
objective processes and developments within public organizations and, at least in the absence of 
stringent limitations, as reliable predictors of administrative behaviour (see Aberbach et al. 1981; 
Bauer et al. 2009). 
 The survey was implemented online, with standardized webpages being built in the national 
language(s) for each country. Flexibility was allowed, and even recommended, in the data collection 
strategies used by national teams, due to major differences in administrative cultures between the 
countries. A major emphasis was put on a thorough data cleaning and harmonization at the end of 
the survey, to make sure that final results were comparable across countries and that any deviations 
allowed during the implementation process were explained and controlled.5  
The survey was launched in May 2012 and implemented in two rounds (May-July 2012, and 
September-November 2012). In these two rounds combined, the survey was sent out to over 20.000 
high ranking civil servants in the ten participating countries via post and email (using either a 
personalized access link or an anonymous one), depending on each country´s predefined access 
strategy. Invitations were followed by reminders and, in cases where response rates were low, teams 
took additional measures, such as phone or postal reminders, to increase the number of survey 
participants. In the beginning of November 2012, all surveys were closed, and all datasets were 
cleaned, checked and harmonized according to a standardised procedure for all countries.  
Table 1. Number of invitations and response rates of the COCOPS survey (by end of December 2012) 
Country Invitations Sent* 
Survey 
completions 
Response rate % 
Austria 1745 637         36.50  
Estonia 913 321         35.16  
France 5297 1193         22.52  
Germany  2295 566         24.66  
Hungary 1200 351         29.25  
Italy 1703 343         20.14  
Netherlands 977 293         29.99  
Norway 1299 436         33.56  
Spain 1778 321         18.05  
UK 3100 353         11.39  
Total 20307 4814         23.71  
*The invitations sent represent the final number of invitations that has reached respondents, after the exclusion of any 
failure deliveries, wrong addresses etc.  
                                                          
5
 The details of the survey design and implementation process can be found in the survey Research Report (see 
Hammerschmid, Oprisor, Stimac, 2013). 
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By the end of 2012 there were 4814 valid answers available from ten participating countries 
and an overall response rate of 23.7% (for details see Table 1). These answers are the basis 
for the respective country reports. The data in both the national and the integrated datasets 
are subject to strict anonymity regulations, to protect individual respondents, whereas 
aggregate data will be published according to a set of rules commonly agreed upon by the 
research teams involved. 
The current country report summarizes the findings for Spain, along with some comparisons with the 
results from all the surveys carried out in Austria, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain and the UK. 
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2. Context and Status Quo of Public Administration Reform in Spain 
 
Throughout the period covering the transition to democracy to the present, the Spanish public sector 
has undergone major changes and reforms, in some cases resulting from the aim to change the 
Francoist public administration model and, in other cases, with the main goal of public administration 
modernization (Prats, 2010). For the following brief summary of the Spanish public sector reforms, 
we rely mainly on Alba and Navarro (2011), Sevilla et al (2010), Ongaro (2009) and Parrado (2008).  
 
In the past 30 years, Spain has undergone a deep process of public administration reforms. The first 
period corresponds to the late 1970s, when Spain began a series of reforms with the aim of changing 
the highly bureaucratized public administration and, in order to build a new relationship with its 
citizens, trying to change the traditional inaccessibility of centralized national bureaucracies. At this 
time, an important process of reform of the administrative red tape was introduced, focusing on the 
reform of the organization of ministerial and administrative bodies, a legacy of the Francoism. In 
general, and with slight changes, the current governance structure is virtually identical to that 
established at this stage of the transition to democracy. 
 
In the 1980s and mid 1990s, the main measures of administrative reform focused on the 
decentralization process with the creation and operation of regional governments and the 
establishment of the basic regulation of local governments. Surprisingly, the traditional Napoleonic 
model was reproduced by the new regions, as well as developing its own bureaucratic system. At the 
same time, a profound reform of the legislation relating to public servants took place, to give answer 
to the new demands of a democratic administration and to eliminate some perceived pathologies of 
a closed model with roots in the Francoist administration. 
 
In the 1990s the concept of “reform” changed to the concept of “modernization”, whose focus would 
be to improve administration-citizen relations. The 1988 Spanish edition of the OECD document The 
administration as service: The public as client, served as a starting point — to some extent — for new 
lines of public sector reform. A new vision of ”managing” staff began, in line with what had already 
happened in other European countries, based on the idea that citizens were increasingly treated as 
consumers, or users of the services of the Administration, in line with the NPM concept. 
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In 1989, the Ministry of Public Administration began a process of internal debate about public 
management modernization through the elaboration of the "Delphi Study on modernization of 
operating procedures in public administration." As a result of this process in 1992 the Plan for 
Modernization of the Central Government was approved. 
 
With these reforms the government intended that concepts such as efficiency, quality and 
effectiveness were to become priority values of administrative action. This reform process tried to 
improve and simplify administrative procedures, the use of ICTs and the concern about the 
recruitment and training of public managers, among other issues. From a practical standpoint, this 
modernization process provided some necessary elements to address posterior administrative 
reform actions and had — to some extent — a clear political impulse and leadership. 
 
However, the implementation of the Plan for Modernization of the Spanish public administration did 
not respond to the high expectations of change, because of, at least partially, the resistance from the 
public servants elites to confront the profound changes of the organizational model, through the 
adoption of NPM-related mechanisms, such as management by objectives, management autonomy, 
results orientation, etc. 
 
At a later stage6 and, with the consolidation of the autonomous communities — with transfers in 
education and health and the promotion of the Local Agreement (the so-called "second 
decentralization") — the actions in the reform and modernization have focused on five strategies: (1) 
To set up a flexible, agile and efficient organizational structure; (2) To reform the administrative 
courts; (3) To establish a new regulatory framework for human resources; (4) To promote efficiency 
and quality in service delivery; and (5) To incorporate new technologies inside public administration. 
 
In addition to these specific measures, a Committee of Experts was constituted in April 2003, 
constituted of professors and senior officials, to advance public sector modernization. Finally, in 2005 
the Spanish government approved the National Reform Program based on the Lisbon Strategy, 
including measures that, even if they were economic policies in its broadest sense, has been the 
basis for many administrative reforms in the last 7 years as, for example, the development of the Law 
of State Agencies, which was considered one of the key element in the attempt to modernize the 
Spanish Public Administration. Following Alba and Navarro (2011), the new law of State Agencies has 
the following focus: (1) transparency of public services; (2) to implement NPM-related policies such 
                                                          
6 Since 1996 
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as managing by results; (3) to improve policy design within agencies; (4) to favor cooperation and 
collaboration among different bodies; and (5) to promote the evaluation of public services. 
 
From 2008 onwards — as a result of the ongoing financial and economic crises — reforms were 
mainly driven by budgetary pressures. The main reform actions taken by the Spanish Government 
over the past years were mainly austerity measures in order to cope with the concurrent problems of 
lower revenues and higher public debt. 
 
Table 2. Spanish key administrative reforms 
Period 
 
Reform focus Mechanism 
1977-1984 Organizational reforms 
Civil service reorganization 
Legal reforms 
1990-1995 New relationship with citizenship 





1997-2004 PA organization 
Evaluation of public services 
Legal reforms 
White paper 





Development of new ICTs 
2008-2012 Cutback measures Legal reforms 
Budgetary constraints 
Based on Alba and Navarro (2011)  
3. Data and Method 
3.1 Sampling and Access Strategy and Survey Implementation 
 
The Spanish COCOPS survey was conducted by a team of researchers at the Department of 
Economics, University of Cantabria. In keeping with the survey’s general sampling principles and 
population definition, the Spanish sample represents almost the full census, with the exception of 
Health services because of lack of contact data. 
 
In line with the sampling strategy the survey invitations were sent to the first three — and in some 
cases four —  levels of public sector executives in all regional government ministries, the Central 
Government and agencies directly subordinated to central government ministries. 
 
COCOPS Work Package 3, Country Report Spain – April 2013  Page 10 
As regards central government, firstly we addressed the mentioned three hierarchical levels in 
ministries and agencies; State Secretaries7, General Secretaries and General Directorates 
(departmental heads) of each ministry. However, due to the lack of responses we addressed the 
second round of the survey to the next hierarchical level, that is, general sub- directorates, which are 
in charge of policy implementing and should be free of political interference. For the employment 
sector, we addressed the aforementioned three hierarchical levels of the Central Ministry of Labor 
and regional ministries of labor, plus directors of the 50 provincial SEPE 8 offices, and directors of the 
17 regional employment services. Similarly, for the health sector we addressed three hierarchical 
levels of the Central Ministry of health and regional ministries, including 13 of the 17 regional health 
services. The main issue with regional health services was we did not get contact data for 4 of them. 
 
With regards to access, for Spain an e-mail distribution seemed the best option to achieve high 
response rates. However, because of the difficulty of getting personal email addresses of many of the 
components of the sample, we decided to complement the distribution via e-mail with postal letters 
in cases where the e-mail distribution was not possible. The invitations were therefore sent by e-mail 
and regular post, including a link to the survey webpage and instructions on how to fill in the 
answers: either directly online –using the Spanish webpage –or by returning the filled in 
questionnaire received via post, fax or email. A PDF version of the questionnaire was also available 
on the survey webpage for download. 
 
The Spanish survey was kept quite close to the core questionnaire, with only three optional question 
added. These questions were added to get additional information about the cutback measures 
addressed by the Spanish Government and, to assess the influence of international and 
supranational organizations — such as the IMF, the OECD or the EU — on the reform process.  
 
The first round of email and postal invitations for the Spanish survey were distributed to respondents 
4-5 June 2012, with the deadline of 29th June.  Email reminders were sent 19th June before the 
deadline on 29th June. Initial invitations were sent to 451 contacts from the three sectors analyzed, 
due to lack of contact data. Three months before launching the survey the whole government in 
Spain was changed and most of the contact details from practitioners were removed from the 
websites as the government underwent reorganization. Though new staff was recruited, 
unfortunately the new policy of the incoming PP government was to not list the emails of most 
                                                          
7 States Secretaries were only included in the case of financial, employment and health services due to their 
relevance for the survey. 
8 Servicio Público de Empleo Estatal (State Public Employment Service). 
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government representatives online. Fortunately, through an update of a top public servants 
database, we got access to the names and postal addresses of almost all the target population. 
Thanks to this database and through phone calls and contacts with different public administration 
departments we increased the sample in 1327 people, to which the survey was sent in a second 
round on September 12th, with the deadline of 10th October. Again, email remainders were sent 
24th September to the second subsample, summing up a total of 1778 invitations after the two 
rounds. 
 
Overall, a total of 1778 invitations were sent out: 1282 to central government executives, 201 to 
health sector executives, and 295 to executives in the employment sector. In total the survey 
received 321 partially or fully filled out answers, which leads to an overall response rate of around 
18.1%, as shown in Table 2 below. Total response rates in the Spanish case, as well as those at 
central government level are relatively lower than those from the overall COCOPS survey (18.1% 
Spain vs. 23.7% in overall COCOPS sample). For the health sector the Spanish response rate is again 
relatively lower (23.4% vs. 30.7%) like for the employment sector (18.6% vs. 26.9%). 
 
Table 3. Sample size and response rates 
 Central 
Government 
Health Sector Employment 
Sector 
Spain Total Total COCOPS 
sample 
Invitations sent 1282 201 295 1778 20307 
Completed 
surveys 











Looking at the survey results and their distribution across policy fields (see Figure 1 – please note 
that respondents were allowed to select more than one option), we can see how a considerable 
share of responses comes from the areas of justice, public order and safety (17.6%), employment 
services (15.6%), infrastructure and transportation (13.9%) and health (13.3%). The lowest response 
rates are found in the fields of defense (1.7%) and foreign affairs (2.5%), indicating a somewhat more 
closed administrative culture in these two areas. 
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Figure 1. Policy field sample shares 
 
 
Unless otherwise indicated, the following categories are used to interpret the results: if a scale 
ranging from 1 to 7 is used, 1 meaning ‘Strongly disagree’ and 7 meaning ‘Strongly agree’, the 
percentage shares for scale numbers 1 and 2 (vs. 6 and 7) are added and interpreted as ’disagree’ (vs. 
‘agree’). 
  
3.2 Organizational Context of Respondents 
Before exploring respondents' opinions and attitudes towards their role and work in public 
administration, here we establish some of the key contextual features that set the organizational and 
personal background of the respondents as described in chapters 4 to 8.  
 
Organization type (see Figure 2). Among the respondents, the greatest share (51.72%) come from 
ministries at the regional level (Comunidad Autónoma); this in line with the relative share of 
invitations sent to regional level executives (62.77%) and with the overall population since, in Spain, 
almost  80% of public servants work for sub-central government levels (OECD, 2011). 25.08 % of 
respondents work at the central ministry level, while only a 16.3% work for agencies or subordinate 
government body at the central government level (vs. 32.4% for the overall COCOPS sample), which 
may be explained by the relatively small number of agencies existing in Spain. The share of answers 
coming from executives at the state level agencies is even lower (5.02%) and from levels beyond 
state government the response share was only a small 1.88% of total responses. 
 
Organization size (see Figure 2). Almost   50% of respondents work in organizations with up to 500 
employees, similar to the overall COCOPS sample (where 50.9% come from such organizations). 
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sample). Finally, around 18.8% of respondents come from organizations with over 5000 employees 
(vs. 16.9% in the overall COCOPS sample). 
 




3.2 Socio-demographic Background of Respondents 
 
Gender (see Figure 3). Over two thirds of respondents are men (67.88%), and only 32.12% are 
women, a share which shows how, despite the efforts of the former socialist government to promote 
gender equality, there is still a long way to go to promote gender equality in the Spanish Public 
Administration. By comparison, Spain is in line with the overall COCOPS sample, in which over a third 
(32.1%) of the respondents are women.  
 
Age (see Figure 3). 72.31% of respondents are of an age between 36-55 years (vs. 61.6% in the 
overall COCOPS sample), with another 20.86% being aged between 56-65 years. 5% of the Spanish 
respondents are under 35, in line with the 5.8% in the overall COCOPS sample.  
 
Hierarchical level (see Figure 3). With regard to their position in the hierarchy most respondents 
(51.4%) are executives at the third hierarchical level (General directorates and sub-directorates or 
similar). Over a third of the respondents (39.88.1%) are at the second level, and the remaining 8.72% 
are at the top hierarchical level. The overall COCOPS sample has a higher share of respondents from 
the first level (24.2%), more or less the same answers from the second level (40.4%) and considerably 






Ministry at central government level
Agency or subordinate government body at central government level
Ministry at state or regional government level
Agency or subordinate government body at state or regional government
level







< 50 50-99 100-499
500-999 1000-5000 > 5000
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Education (see Figure 3). Almost two thirds of all respondents (61.25%) have a university degree only 
at Bachelor level. The shares of top executives with university degrees at Master (25.46%) or PhD 
level (13.28%) are considerably lower than the COCOPS sample (68.8% and 15.5%), which may reflect 
a below average education level of Spanish public sector executives.   
 
As to the disciplinary field of education (see Figure 4), the highest percentage of respondents still 
comes from the field of law (34.6%), which may reflect the legalistic tradition of the Spanish 
Napoleonic  administrative culture.  In the late 1980s the Spanish Government attempted to break 
with the long legalistic tradition by introducing new management practices (Alba and Navarro, 2011), 
which may be reflected by the fact that the second education field from respondents was business, 
management and economics (23.4%). However, despite the changes made in the Spanish public 
administration towards its modernization, the legal profession is still the majority among top public 
executives. Other fields represented in the Spanish sample were natural sciences and engineering 
(18.5%), other social sciences and humanities (12.2%), political science and public administration 









35 or less 36-45 46-55




Top hierarchical level in organisation
Second hierarchical level in organisation




Graduate degree (BA level)
Postgraduate degree (MA level)
PhD/doctoral degree
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Figure 4. Educational fields (respondents could check more than one field) 
 
Tenure (see Figure 5).The results related to the respondents´ tenure and sector experiences show 
many characteristics of the Spanish public administration, such as life-long careers in the civil service 
and lack of experience on the private sector. A share of 65.9% of the respondents has worked in the 
public sector for more than twenty years (vs. 58.2% in the overall COCOPS sample, and only 4.9% 
have a public sector experience of less than five years (vs. 13.8% in the overall COCOPS sample).  A 
share of 52.2% of respondents have been working in the current organization for more than 10 years, 
but only a 11.6% declared to work in the same position for more than 10 years (vs. a 16.0% for the 
COCOPS sample), which may indicate a rather low mobility within the sector but, a higher degree of 
mobility within positions.  
 
When looking at the respondents’ experience outside the public sector, we see that over a quarter of 
public sector executives have little private sector experience, with 25.9% of the respondents having 
no previous private sector experience and a 56% with less than five years experience. Previous 
experience in the non-profit sector is not common in Spain, with 71.4% of respondents declaring no 
experience in the non-profit sector (considerably higher to 55.9% in the overall COCOPS sample.  






















0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
…in the public sector  
…in your current organisation 
…in your current position 
…in the private sector  
…in the non-profit sector 
None Less than 1 year 1- 5 years 5-10 years  10-20 years More than 20 years
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4. Values and Attitudes of Public Sector Executives 
 
After describing the respondents with regard to their organizational and socio-demographic 
background, the following section will present some data on how public sector executives in Spain 
perceive their role as executives, their motivation and social values and preferences.  
 
Identity and role perception as executive (see Figure 6). When asked about their self-understanding 
as public sector executives, a majority of the respondents confirms ensuring an efficient use of 
resources (79.4.%), ensuring impartial implementation of law and rules (78.5%) and achieving results 
(73.9%), finding joint solutions to solve problems of public concern (70%) and providing expertise and 
technical knowledge (63.5%) as central for their role. Other aspects such as getting public 
organizations to work together (51.3%) and providing a voice for societal interests (40.2%)  are also 
strongly anchored but to a much lesser degree. Interestingly, only a 25.9% agree on developing new 
public agendas as part of their role as executives, which may indicate the low degree of autonomy of 
Spanish executives. 
Figure 6. Identity and self-understanding (Q: I mainly understand my role as public executive as) 
 
 
Value preferences for public sector priorities (see Figure 7). In another question the survey asked for 
more general preferences with regard to public sector priorities based on polarizing options. With 
regard to values, we do not find clear preferences between traditional civil service and new 
managerial views. However, we see values such as citizen orientation over customer orientation 
(agreement 52.3% vs. 10.5% disagreement), state provision of public services over market provision 
(35.5% agrees with state provision vs. a 14.4% which prefers market provision), equity over efficiency 
(26.7% vs. 18.1%) and tax financed services over user fees (26.4% vs. 18.1%), which may indicate 
some degree of preference for traditional public service delivery. On the other side a substantial 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Ensuring impartial implementation of laws and…
Getting public organisations to work together
Achieving results
Providing a voice for societal interests
Developing new policy agendas
Providing expertise and technical knowledge
Finding joint solutions to solve problems of…
Ensuring efficient use of resources
Strongly disagree … … … … … Strongly agree
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share of respondents shows a positive assessment of efficiency (23.5%) vs. quality (14.1%) of public 
service delivery, which seems a bit contradictory with other responses. 
Figure 7. Priorities as public servants (Q: Public services often need to balance different priorities. Where would you place 
your own position?) 
 
Motivation (see Figure 8). As regards public sector motivation and, following the common distinction 
of extrinsic, altruistic and intrinsic motivation, our results confirm a clear prevalence of intrinsic and 
altruistic motivations among Spanish public sector executives. The greatest importance is given to 
interesting work (88.9% agreement vs. 0.7% disagreement) followed by doing something useful for 
society (76.7% vs. 0.4%) and opportunities to help other people (62.8% vs. 1.1%). However, there is 
also one extrinsic factor such as job security (60.9%) of special relevance for Spanish public servants. 
Other extrinsic factors do not seem as relevant as those mentioned, such as good opportunities for 
promotion (49.3%), high income (47.7%), flexible working hours (31.9%) and social status (18.8%).  
 
Figure 8. Motivation (Q: How important do you personally think it is in a job to have) 
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5. Characteristics of the Work Context in Public Administration 
 
The success of introducing management practices like performance management to the public sector 
depends on the extent to which the specific work context in public administration resonates with the 
logic behind the NPM paradigm. This chapter analyses how Spanish top civil servants perceive their 
work context and evaluates to what extent the results indicate that management practices can be 
transferred successfully to Public Administration.  
 
Performance management and result-orientation is difficult to implement if goals are perceived to be 
ambiguous and activities are less measureable and easy to observe (Rainey and Jung 2010). To 
reliably measure performance, goals would have to be limited, clearly stated and communicated, and 
activities would have to be easily observed and monitored. When asked about these characteristics 
of their work context (see Figure 9), there appears to be a high degree of discrepancy among Spanish 
public sector executives about the possibility of observing and measuring their organization’s 
activities: 27.4% of respondents agree that their activities can be observed and measured easily, 
while 25.2%  disagree. Similarly, a 28.6% of the respondents agree that their organization has a high 
number of goals, while a 22.0% perceive their number of goals to be rather limited.  
 
It seems that respondents agree that organization goals are clearly stated (50.5%), while only 10.9% 
disagree with that statement. However, transparency does not seem to be one of the “strong” points 
in Spanish Public Administration; 35.3% of the respondents report that their goals are clearly 
communicated to all staff, while a relatively high 23.4% believe that this is not the case. 
Public executives from the overall COCOPS sample are more positive about the clear statement 
(77.6%) and, particularly about the clear communication of goals (73 % for the COCOPS sample vs. 
35.3% for Spain) 
Figure 9. Goal ambiguity (Q: To what extent do the following statements apply to your organization?) 
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Management autonomy is a further variable influencing the transferability of management practices 
to the public sector. The less autonomy top executives enjoy in managing their organization, the less 
they can be made accountable for successes or failures. The results (see Figure 10) show that, in 
general, Spanish executives perceive they enjoy a very low degree of autonomy. Only a 17.7% of the 
respondents perceive a rather high degree of autonomy in choosing and designing policies which is a 
very low value compared with the overall COCOPS sample (40% of respondents perceived a rather 
high degree of autonomy), and a 27.5% concerning the implementation of policies (61.7 % 
internationally). Managerial autonomy is also lower as regards changes in the structure of their 
organization (12.6% think they have a lot of autonomy) and contracting out services (12.0% think 
they have a lot of autonomy). Autonomy in Human Resource decisions is extremely low in Spanish 
Public Administration, and the share of respondents who believe they have a high degree of 
autonomy, as regards promoting, hiring or removing personnel, is only between 4% and 6%. Finally, 
autonomy in allocating budget is also relatively low (only a 20.1% of respondents believe they have 
high autonomy about budget allocation). 
 
Figure 10. Degree of management autonomy (Q: In my position, I have the following degree of autonomy with regard to) 
 
 
Interaction frequency is a way to measure the coordination intensity of public sector executives and 
also could be seen as an indicator for fragmentation challenges. If the different organizations that are 
relevant to provide public goods tend to work in a relatively isolated atmosphere and do not 
regularly work together, the public sector is characterized by a ‘silo culture’. The Spanish public 
sector — due to the decentralization process implemented over the last few decades — would be 
expected to be rather fragmented and our results tend to support this diagnosis (see Figure 11): not 
surprisingly, Spanish public sector executives interact most often with the actors within their own 
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organization – 87.2% interact daily with their direct staff, 88.9% interact at least weekly with their 
administrative superiors and higher administrative levels and 74.0% interact weakly or daily with 
administrative units within their organizations. Interaction with subordinate agencies and bodies 
does not occur as often (only 54.4% have at least weekly contact) and interaction with their 
responsible minister is rather rare (18.2 have at least monthly contact). Among the outside actors, 
such as other government bodies, private sector, other government tiers and audit organizations, 
low levels of interaction take place in all the areas surveyed. Low levels of interaction take place also 
with international bodies, trade union representatives and European Union institutions. 
A comparative perspective reveals significant lower degrees of Spanish top executives’  interaction 
with their minister, international bodies and European Union institutions. 
 




In contrast to interaction frequency, coordination quality is a more qualitative than quantitative 
measure of fragmentation in public administration. Among those who answered (see Figure 12), only 
16.1% perceive the collaboration between government bodies, private and voluntary sector 
stakeholders as good. Similar shares praise the collaboration between national and local/regional 
government bodies (17.7%) and between national government bodies within the same policy area 
(16.9%). Considerably lower shares are observed between national and supranational bodies or 
international organizations (6.2%) and between national government bodies from different policy 
areas (6.3%). It is of interest that other countries’ executives evaluate coordination quality much 
more favourably in all cases, particularly as regards collaboration between government bodies. 
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In summary, and inline r with previous question results, public sector executives perceptions may 
indicate that in Spain there is a big coordination deficit and fragmentation is a major concern in 
Spanish public administration. 
 
Figure 12. Coordination quality (Q: How would you characterize collaboration in your own policy field between) 
 
 
The degree of politicization indicates to what extent public sector institutions can make decisions on 
technical criteria or are subject to being influenced by political processes. In the Spanish sample, 
politicization does not seem to be present in routine activities; only 24.1% agree that politicians 
interfere in these (see Figure 13). However, only 27.1% of the senior executives feel that politicians 
respect their technical expertise and, interestingly, 76.3% of respondents agree that politicians 
regularly influence senior-level appointments, and reforms are more likely to be initiated by 
politicians than by senior executives (only 11.1% think that senior executives and not politicians 
initiate reforms or new policies). In addition, 35.1% of respondents agree that removing issues and 
activities from the realms of politics produces better policies (vs. 27.0% disagreeing).  
A comparative perspective reveals the relatively high degree of politicization of the Spanish public 
administration. For example, 53.9 % of European respondents feel that politicians respect their 
technical expertise in comparison with 27.1% for the Spanish case. Also, the perception that 
politician regularly influence senior-level appointments is much higher in Spain than in the overall 
COCOPS sample. 
These results take into account the perceived extensive politicization of Spanish public organizations. 
As described by Nieto (1996), the 1980s reforms generated a "spoil system" model, where the 
political party winning the election holds a leadership position in the public sector. As a result, it is 
common that leading political party members replace — or displace — experts and/or top-qualified 
public servants in the upper levels of the public administration. Due to the characteristics of the 
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Spanish university system, professorial posts can be “frozen” when scholars pass to politics. Thus it is 
common that Ministers are former university professors, and vice versa. This has perverse effects on 
the university as a department becomes heavily represented by Socialists when the conservative PP 
are in power, and vice versa! 
 
Figure 13. Degree of politization (Q: What is your view on the following statements) 
 
In sum, coordination deficits and fragmentation are clearly observable in the respondents´ answers 
and seem to be a major challenge, whereas lack of autonomy and politicization seem to be even a 
bigger concern for the Spanish respondents.  
6. Relevance of NPM and post NPM Reforms 
 
This chapter provides information on public sector executives’ perception of the implementation of 
NPM and post NPM reforms which are characterized by a stronger emphasis on coordination and 
networked forms of governance. The respondents have been asked to assess the type and character 
of reform trends in their policy field (6.1.), their organization (6.2.) and in their own work (6.3.). 
6.1. Policy field level 
Public sector reform trends can have very different characteristics. While classical NPM reforms 
include measures like performance management, contracting out, privatization or flexible 
employment, other reforms aim at enhancing transparency, citizen participation or reducing 
bureaucracy. With regard to the reform trends at the policy field level (see Figure 14) we see how 
some of NPM types of reform, such as privatization or agentification are of only limited relevance in 
Spain; 50% of the respondents state that privatization occurs rarely (vs. 15.7% who think that 
important privatization policies have been carried out), and 54.3% of respondents think that 
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agentification occurs rarely (vs. 12.1% thinking the opposite). A third clearly NPM-related policy, such 
as the use of contracting out, seems to have been carried out in Spain in a more systematic way; only 
a 31.7% of respondents state that contracting out polices occur rarely. These perceptions make sense 
because privatization is associated with the sale of public utilities and industrial firms, whilst 
outsourcing is a form of privatization more prevalent in the Public Administration sector. In addition, 
it seems that state provision is also not extended into new areas; only 8.6% of the respondents state 
that this happens to a large extent (percentage share for scale numbers 6 and 7). Moreover, the 
public sector is clearly subject to considerable downsizing; 52.4% of the respondents state that this 
occurs to a large extent making this the most prominent reform trend in Spain (together with digital 
e-government and transparency and open government). Other reform trends which have a 
moderately high prominence in Spain are cutting red tape (46.6%) and customer orientation (40.7%).  
 
From an international comparative perspective, public sector executives from other countries 
perceived, in general, a much more frequent implementation of, particularly,  flexible employment, 
agentification, customer orientation and citizens’ participation. While reform trend such as public 
sector downsizing and e-government initiatives seem to be in line with the overall COCOPS sample.  
Overall, the results may suggest the latecomer position of the Spanish public administration as 
regards public sector reforms. 
 
Figure 14. Importance of reform trends (Q: How important are the following reform trends in your policy area?) 
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When asking for the dynamics of public sector reform (see Figure 15), we are interested in finding 
out how public sector executives evaluate the reforms that have been implemented. With regard to 
the overall assessment of the success of public administration reforms in Spain the overall picture is 
clear: 31.9% of the respondents perceive the reforms as not successful (scales 1-3), while only 10.8% 
of respondents is of the opinion that the reforms were successful (scales 8-10). As regards the 
consistency of the reforms, the results are rather mixed and equal. The same is true for the 
categories substantial vs. symbolic and demanding vs. not demanding enough. Turning now to the 
drivers and dynamics of the reforms the picture is again clear. Public sector reform in Spain seems to 
be implemented predominantly without public involvement (65.7% agreement), top-down (56.2%), 
driven by politicians (59.6%) and for the crisis (64.9%), and clearly contested by the unions (65.8%). 
In addition, reforms seem to be more about cost-cutting and savings (65.2% agreement) than about 
service improvement (10.5% agreement). 
 
Figure 15. Dynamics of public sector reform (Q: Public sector reforms in my policy area tend to be) 
 
 
6.2. Organizational level 
 
From the survey results we see how management instruments have only a rather low relevance at 
the level of organizations. There is not any concept systematically implemented and used in the 
Spanish public administration (see Figure 16). The only instrument used by a relatively high share of 
the respondents is the use of service points to customers (43.2% of respondents agree). Extremely 
infrequent are performance related pay and risk management (71.4% and 60.0% of the Spanish 
respondents state that they do not use these kind of instruments). Instruments fostering 
management autonomy such as the decentralization of staffing decisions or financial decisions are 
uncommon as well (50.3% and 48.2% of respondents do not use them respectively). Other 
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managerial tools such as cost accounting systems and benchmarking do not seem to be used much, 
with 53.5% and 40.9% of respondents stating they do not rather use these instruments. With regard 
to codes of conduct and quality management systems, no clear patterns are observable here even 
their implementation and usage also seem to be limited. 
Public sector executives in the overall COCOPS sample use these instruments to a much greater 
extent than Spanish executives, particularly as regards the use of performance appraisals, 
business/strategic planning, management by objectives, performance related pay and benchmarking. 
This clearly confirms our previous results about the low degree of implementation of managerial 
reforms in the Spanish public administration.  
 




Regarding the use of performance management tools – with measurement and goals/targets as core 
elements – our results are shown in Figure 17. Neither goal achievements are rewarded nor non-
achievement sanctioned. Politicians do not use indicators to monitor performance and only outcome 
orientation seems to be used to a certain —but relatively low — extent (23.1% of respondents agree 
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A question on the use of different coordination solutions (see Figure 18) tries to capture to what 
extent post NPM reforms in the form of new coordination mechanisms and measures to counter 
fragmentation have been implemented. As already observed in chapter 5, fragmentation and a 
hierarchical work culture are apparent in Spain. This is also supported by the current data. In the case 
of coordination problems, the most common action is to refer the issue upwards in the hierarchy 
(58.3% do this often) and only 24.7% of the respondents would decide on one lead organization. The 
other more post-NPM led proposals are quite unpopular among the Spanish executives; they would 
not set up a permanent special purpose body (68.0%), consult civil society organizations (62.3%), set 
up a cross-cutting working group (51.2%), set up a cross-cutting policy arrangement (47.3%) or 
consult relevant experts (45.7%).  
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Thus, at the organizational and policy field level, we can say that Spanish executives do not perceive 
many public sector reform trends have been implemented in their policy field, and classical 
performance management reforms are weekly institutionalized on the organizational level. The next 
sub-chapter provides information on the use of performance indicators at the level of individual 
senior executives 
 
6.3. Individual level 
 
Enquiring on the use of performance indicators (see Figure 19) is to identify the fields of application 
where public sector executives are most likely to use performance indicators. We already know that 
these do not seem to be used extensively in Spanish public administration. This observation is not as 
clear for the individual level of public sector executives; the response rates are widely dispersed 
among the different response options (that is, between not at all and to a large extent), making it 
difficult to establish a clear pattern, so we cannot get clear conclusions about the use of performance 
indicators at an individual level. 
 
Figure 19. Use of performance indicators (Q: In my work I use performance indicators to) 
 
  
COCOPS Work Package 3, Country Report Spain – April 2013  Page 28 
7. Impact of the Fiscal Crisis on Public Administration 
 
After a relatively long period of economic growth, with growth rates above the average of the EU 
economies, the first symptoms of the international financial crisis began to be visible in Spain in 
2008, and at the same time the first effects of the crisis began to hit the Spanish economy, as a result 
of high financial exposure to the housing sector. The ongoing economic crisis resulted in a reduction 
of financial and economic activity, with a significant drop in GDP per capita, a significant increase in 
public debt and deficits, and a marked increase in the unemployment rate. 
 
This significant worsening of socio-economic conditions was caused, to a great extent, by the 
outbreak of the international financial crisis in 2008, but also because of the intrinsic characteristics 
of the Spanish growth model, whose main pillars were the housing sector and an increasing domestic 
demand, combined with the high sensitivity of the Spanish economy to foreign demand. The current 
weakness of the Spanish economy made it especially vulnerable to the intensification of the 
sovereign debt crisis in August 2011 and its extension to several countries in the Euro area. 
Moreover, intensification of fiscal adjustment plans developed by the Government to meet the 
deficit target assumed by Spain in the Stability Programme, is having a clear contractive impact on 
investment and spending, both public and private. 
 
As a result, the GDP per capita (in real terms) has fallen about 5% between 2008 and 2011, the 
unemployment rate has risen from 8.3% in 2007 to 21.7% in 2011, and 26.6% in November, 2012, 
being one of the highest unemployment rates in the EU (together with Greece). The Government 
deficit went from 1.9% surplus in 2007 to 8.5% deficit in 2011, with a maximum peak of 11.2% in 
2009.  
Given this situation — and following EU recommendations — the Spanish Government adopted a 
series of cutback measures to contain public debt and government deficit, which included freezing or 
reducing public employee wages and public employment offer, 20% reduction of organic structures 
of the General State Administration, plus Regional and Local Governments, cutting unemployment 
benefits, cuts in public investment in infrastructure and foreign aid, cutting expenditures in 
medicines, cuts in provision of basic public services, such as libraries and health clinics, among other 
cutback measures. 
 
Given the drastic and largely non-consensual, cutback program conducted by the Spanish 
government in the last three years, it is not surprising that the COCOPS survey responses by Spanish 
executives assert as a general finding that most of the respondents have observed some kind of 
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cutbacks (see Figure 20). Over two thirds of respondents (64.77%) perceive that the Government 
performed targeted cuts according to priorities rather than across-the-board savings (24.2%). 
Interestingly, a very small percentage of respondents consider that saving strategies were focused on 
improving efficiency and productivity, which shows the low prevalence of managerial ideas within 
the Spanish public administration and, gives an idea of the short-term, reactive, nature of Spanish 
policy-makers. 
 
Figure 20. Overall saving strategy (Q: In response to the fiscal crisis how would you describe the broader approach to 
realizing savings in your policy area?) 
 
 
With regard to the more specific approaches to implementing cutbacks (see Figure 21) the survey 
clearly confirms that the leading cost-cutting measures have been the following:  hiring freezes 
(79.2% agree), wage freezes (85.0%) and pay cuts (79.9%) — including bonuses —, cutbacks in 
existing programs (62.5%) and postponing or cancelling new programs (69.7%). In relation to offices 
reduction and increased user fees, we see how there is a large answer dispersion, which may suggest 
that the measures have not been implemented equally in all public administration areas. Finally, it 
seems that staff layoffs were not one of the major cost-cutting measures undertaken by the 
Government, mainly due to the special legal status of most of the public servants. Just over half of 
the survey participants (53.88%) stated that in their area this measure has not been taken at all 
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Figure 21. Cutback measures at organizational level (Q: In response to the fiscal crisis, to what extent has your 
organization applied the following cutback measures?) 
 
 
8. Outcomes of Public Administration Performance  
 
One main goal of the present study is to obtain systematic information on how public sector 
executives assess the impact of the various managerial reforms at organizational level but also other 




As concerns an overall assessment of public administration (see Figure 22), a relatively low share of 
respondents state that the way public administration is run in Spain has clearly improved (only  
11.7% marked 8-10 on a 10 digit scale) over the last 5 years. 50.7% respondents rather assess it as 
more or less the same (marked 4-7), whereas a relatively high share of respondents observes a clear 
deterioration of public administration in Spain over the last 5 years (37.6% marked 1-3), which may 
be directly linked with the cutback program conducted by the Spanish government on the past two 
or three years.  
Interestingly, the Spanish case is the only one in the whole COCOPS sample in which a greater 
number of respondents feel that the public administration performance has worsened in the last five 
years in relation to those who believe that the public administration performance has improved.   
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Figure 22. Overall PA assessment (Q: Compared with five years ago, how would you say things have developed when it 
comes to the way public administration runs in your country?) 
 
 
8.2 Policy Field 
 
It may be misleading, however, to measure outcomes of public administration in such a one-
dimensional way. We therefore provided the respondents with a more nuanced question addressing 
a spectrum of different performance dimensions as found in public management literature (see 
figure 23).  
 
The most positive results can be found for ethical behavior among public servants, equal access to 
services and fair treatment of citizens (34.2%/37.5%/32.1% of respondents think that these 
dimensions improved), which is of great interest since equity should be a key performance 
dimension. Relatively positive results can be observed for service quality, transparency and 
openness, and innovation (26.3%/25.4%/24.4%). 
 
However, we cannot observe such positive results for other key dimensions; one concern is that 
58.7% of respondents state that citizens’ trust in Government has deteriorated (vs. only a 5% which 
state that trust improved). In addition, 30.6% of respondents believe that the public servants 
motivation towards work has deteriorated, and the same applies for attractiveness of the public 
sector as employer (29.8).  A second — and major — concern is the vision that public executives have 
on the evolution of relevant dimensions such as social cohesion and citizen participation. A 33.3% 
believe that social cohesion has deteriorated, while 29.3% considered the same for the case of citizen 
participation. With regard to the other aspects such as cost and efficiency, policy effectiveness or 
cutting red tape, the assessments are rather diverse with similar shares of respondents observing 
improvements and deteriorations. 
Again, the results for the overall COCOPS sample are remarkably different. Most of the different 
performance dimensions are perceived more positively in the overall sample, particularly as regards 
service quality, cost and efficiency, staff motivation and policy effectiveness.  An exception of interest 
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is the attractiveness of the public sector as an employer, which is perceived slightly more positively 
than the overall COCOPS sample. This fact may be explained by the different legal status of public 
servants in terms of labour relationships. 
Figure 23. Different performance dimensions (Q: Thinking about your policy area over the last five years how would you 
rate the way public administration has performed on the following dimensions?) 
 
 
As regards social capital and trust, Spanish executives assess nearly all aspects of social capital and 
trust as positive (See Figure 24). This is especially the case for their assessment of trustworthiness of 
their colleagues (50.7% assess this as positive) and open and honest communication (38.5%). Also 
overall positive, albeit to a lesser degree, is the assessment of all other dimensions (sharing same 
ambitions and vision, team spirit, mutual confidence, information sharing, constructive criticisms) 
with only three exceptions: a rather low share of respondents (17.7%) state that personnel on their 
organization  share the same ambitions and vision for the organization; only 18.2%  view themselves 
as partners in charting the organization’s direction (vs. 24.3% disagreeing), and 18.7% agree that they 
enthusiastically pursue collective goals and mission. 
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Figure 24. Social capital and trust (Q: People in my organization) 
 
 
8.3 Individual Level 
 
Similarly interesting is whether public administration reforms have a positive or negative impact on 
job satisfaction at the individual level. The results confirm a relatively high level of job satisfaction 
among Spanish executives (see Figure 25): 50.2% agree that they get a sense of satisfaction from 
their work (vs. 5.7% disagreeing). Also a relatively high share of 48.0% feels valued for the work they 
do, and interestingly, the lower positive share was observed when recommending their organization 
as a good place to work (40.5% agree vs. 10.1% disagree).  
 
Figure 25. Job satisfaction (Q: When thinking about my work and the organization I work for) 
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A further related question aims to assess the executives´ organizational commitment (see Figure 26) 
a concept commonly used in public management research. For Spain we find a relatively high degree 
of commitment as regards executives feeling the organization problems as their own problems 
(49.0% agree), while lower levels of organizational commitment are observed as regards the other 
questions: only 31% of respondents agree that they would be happy to spend the rest of their 
careers in the same organization, and a relatively low share of respondents (37.6%) state that it 
would be hard for them to leave their organization right now. Interestingly — considering the lack of 
career mobility observed in Spain — a relatively high share of respondents (40.1%) do not think that 
things were better in the days when people stayed with one organization for most of their career.  
 
In overall organizational commitment, Spain does not appear to be very strong, which is a bit 
surprising, due to the lack of mobility in Spanish Public Administrations, as observed in Figure 5. 
 









0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
I really feel as if this organisation's problems are my own
I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career with this
organisation
It would be very hard for me to leave my organisation right now,
even if I wanted to
I was taught to believe in the value of remaining loyal to one
organisation
Things were better in the days when people stayed with one
organisation for most of their career
Strongly disagree … … … … … Strongly agree
COCOPS Work Package 3, Country Report Spain – April 2013  Page 35 
9. Findings from the Employment and Health sector 
 
9.1 Employment Sector  
The analysis for the employment sector – albeit based on a rather small sample of 55 answers – 
yields the following results.  
 
Values and attitudes  
Executives working in the employment sector have a very similar self-understanding and similar 
identity patterns as their colleagues in other policy fields; the main differences are that executives in 
the employment sector consider that giving voice to citizens interests is slightly more relevant for 
them (from a scale ranging from 1 to 7, the mean value for the employment sector is 5 compared to 
4.7 overall). Concerning their view about different priorities as public servants the main difference 
between the employment sector and the overall sample is their view about financing public service 
delivery; from the results it seems that employment executives prefer tax financed services over user 
fees (mean value of 3.3 compared to 3.8 overall). It seems also that they slightly prefer state 
provision of public services instead of market provision (mean value of 3.1 compared to 3.45 overall). 
 
Work context  
As regards the work context, we observe some differences regarding the perceived autonomy 
between executives working in the employment sector and the overall sample. It seems that those 
working in the employment sector perceive — in general — less autonomy  than the overall sample, 
particularly as regards budget allocations (3.1 vs. 3.62), contracting out services (2.26 vs. 3.01), 
promoting and hiring staff (2.5 vs. 2.84 and 1.7 vs. 2.15, respectively), policy choice and design (3 vs. 
3.6) and policy implementation (3.43 vs. 4.16).   
As regards organization objectives and goals, employment executives have a better perception about 
goals communication to the staff (mean value is 5.2 compared to 4.6 of the overall sample). They 
also consider having a higher number of goals than the overall sample (5.01 vs. 4.47). Interestingly 
there is a higher perception of being rewarded for achieving objectives (3.29 vs. 2.2) and state a 
higher extend of the use of performance indicators (3.3 vs. 2.7).  
In general terms, employment executives perceive a lower degree of interaction frequency than the 
overall sample, except the interaction with trade unions, which is considerably higher than the 
overall sample (3.2 vs. 2.5). 
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Relevance of NPM reforms  
Almost all NPM reform trends are equally relevant in the employment sector if compared to the 
overall sample, with the exception of citizens’ participation methods, creation of agencies and intra-
sectoral cooperation, in which employment sector executives perceive slightly less relevance (mean 
values of 3.08 vs. 3.41, 2.58 vs. 2.86 and, 4.27 vs. 4.81, respectively).  
Management instruments are used to a greater extent in the Spanish employment sector than in the 
overall sample. This is especially the case for the use of customer surveys (mean value of 4.03 
compared to 3.5 of the overall sample), service points (5.6 vs. 4.7), management by objectives (4.79 
vs.3.95), decentralization of financial and staffing decisions (3.44 vs.3.02 and 3.29 vs. 2.87, 
respectively), performance related pay (2.46 vs. 2.03) and performance appraisals (3.03 vs. 2.79), 
even considering that mean values for the last two instruments are rather low. 
An interesting point in the Spanish context is the perception of employment executives about 
cutback management measures in their sector. In general they feel lower impact of cutback 
measures compared with the overall sample, particularly as regards staff layoffs (mean value of 2.02 
vs.2.87), reducing front line presence (2.44 vs. 3.18) and increasing user fees (2.20 vs. 3.73), which is 
consistent with our previous findings about targeted cuts in function of the area. This could be 
connected to the fact that the crisis is producing high volumes of unemployed people, creating new 
work for this sector. 
 
Impact of public administration reform  
As concerns the overall assessment of the public administration reform, it seems that employment 
sector executives have a slightly more optimistic view of the reform effects compared to the over 
sample, the mean value being 4.8 over 10 compared with a 4.56 of the overall sample.  
 
9.2 Health Sector  
The analysis for the employment sector – again based on a rather small sample of 47 answers – 
yields the following results. Here, we observe more differences than in the employment sector case. 
 
Values and attitudes  
As regards health sector executives’ self-understanding, there are some interesting differences. 
Firstly, getting public organizations to work together seems less relevant for them (mean value of 4.8 
compared to 5.2 overall). Also they seem to focus less on achieving results (5.6 vs. 6.01) and 
developing new policy agendas (3.8 vs. 4.2). On the contrary, health sector executive consider that 
providing expertise and technical knowledge is slightly more relevant than for the overall sample (5.9 
vs. 5.6). Concerning their view about different priorities as public servants the main difference 
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between the health sector and the overall sample is their view about the trade-off between following 
rules and achieving results; it seems that employment health executives are less concerned about 
following rules than the overall sample (mean value of 4.5 compared to 4.08 overall). 
 
Work context 
As regards the work context, we observe again some differences regarding the perceived autonomy 
between executives working in health sector and the overall sample, but the overall picture is the 
opposite as in the employment sector case. It seems that those working in the health sector perceive 
— in general — more autonomy degree than the overall sample, particularly as regards staff 
promotion (3.43 vs. 2.84) and policy implementation (4.65 vs. 4.16). This could be explained by the 
high level of decentralization in the health sector in Spain.  
Executives working in the health sector perceive their objectives as even more difficult to observe 
and measure; asked whether they agree with the statement that their activities are easy to observe 
and measure, the mean value was 3.9, compared to an already low value of 4.31 for the overall 
sample.  In addition, they state that their objectives are not as clearly stated as for the overall sample 
(4.9 vs. 5.3). 
We observe differences as regards interaction frequency too. Whilst — in general — executives 
working in the health sector perceive a similar or lower degree of interaction with other actors 
compared to the overall sample, they clearly state a higher interaction frequency with administrative 
superiors (5.61 vs. 5.28), subordinate agencies (4.61 vs. 4.13) and media (2.86 vs. 2.5), even the 
former value is still rather low. 
 
Relevance of NPM reforms  
The picture about NPM reform trends is slightly different in the health sector if compared to the 
overall sample. While it appears that some policies have been implemented to a greater extent in the 
health sector compared to the overall sample, others seem to be less relevant.  Policies such as 
corporatization, contracting out and privatization seem to have been more predominant than in the 
overall sample. Particularly the mean values for contracting out and privatization are considerably 
higher (4.4 vs. 3.7 and 3.6 vs. 3, respectively). This largely reflects the privatization process that is 
occurring now in the Spanish health sector in many regions, notably Madrid, Valencia and beyond. 
Interestingly, policies such as intra-sectoral cooperation, strategic alliances and, transparency and e-
government, seem to be less relevant compared with the overall sample.  Particularly lower relatively 
values are observed as regards intra-sectoral cooperation (3.97 vs. 4.61) and transparency (4.75 vs. 
5.11). 
COCOPS Work Package 3, Country Report Spain – April 2013  Page 38 
As in the employment sector case, management instruments are used to a greater extent in the 
Spanish health sector than in the overall sample. This is especially the case for the use of customer 
surveys (mean value of 4.82 compared to 3.5 of the overall sample), internal steering by contract (4 
vs. 2.68), benchmarking (4.12 vs.3.34), decentralization of financial decisions (3.56 vs. 3.02) and risk 
management (3.54 vs. 2.56).  
Again, an interesting point in the Spanish context is the perception of health sector executives about 
cutback management measures. In general they feel the same impact of cutback measures as the 
overall sample. However — and interestingly — it seems that cutback measures such as postponing 
new programs and increasing user fees have been implemented to a greater extent than in other 
sectors (6.07 vs. 5.85, and 4 vs. 3.7, respectively). This last point is of particular interest, since an 
increase in user fees could complicate access to health care services to low-income citizens.  On the 
contrary health sector executives perceive a much lower implementation of downsizing back office 
functions (2.78 vs. 3.9). 
 
Impact of public administration reform  
As concerns the overall assessment of the public administration reform, it seems that employment 
sector executives have the same view of the reforms‘ effects compared to the over sample, the mean 
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10. Conclusion 
 
Spain has been characterized as having inherited a Napoleonic public administration. The transition 
to democracy period in Spain was accompanied by important efforts to reform the Francoist public 
administration model whilst other reforms were driven by more general moves to modernize the 
public administration system (Prats, 2010). From the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, most reforms were 
legalistic, whilst during the 1990s, NPM-style reforms became more influential, especially by focusing 
public administrators on re-building their relationship with the citizen. From the 2000s, NPM-style 
reforms continued, striving to modernize, by improving public service evaluation, civil service 
organization and incorporate ICTs. We noted partial resistance to these reforms on the part of civil 
servants themselves. The most recent round of reforms is connected to deep crisis in the EU: in Spain 
cut backs and budgetary constraints are severely affecting the public sector.  
The results of this COCOPS executive survey confirm such characterizations to a certain extent, and 
overall show more continuity than change in the Spanish public administration sector. However, 
there are some signs of change, albeit uneven, towards NPM, as we will show. 
The results for the Spanish sample confirm that public administration retains some of its traditional 
elements, which generally indicate a prevalence of a classic hierarchical type of public 
administration: legal studies overwhelmingly dominate the educational backgrounds of the 
respondents, respondents were overwhelmingly male, and the executives are comparatively older 
than those in the overall COCOPS sample. Despite their older average age, there is a slimmer top 
level of hierarchy in Spain than in the average COCOPS sample, so age does not necessarily reflect 
the seniority principle, as in the German case.  
As regards job mobility, the COCOPS survey shows how executives may move around different 
positions in the sector, but have little experience in other sectors, including the private sector. 
Around two thirds of executives have worked in the public sector for over twenty years. Over 70% do 
not have any experience in the non-profit sector, suggesting the narrowness of the Spanish public 
administrator.  
As regards the self-perception of their roles as executives we see that Weberian values are still more 
important overall than managerial values. As regards motivation, in Spain, intrinsic and altruistic 
motivation comes out as most important. However, in addition, one extrinsic motivation, job 
security, stands out as very important in Spain. Other extrinsic factors do not seem to be particularly 
relevant, such as flexible hours, promotion or high income.  
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A key part of this report is executives´ perception of their work context. Here we find a large 
discrepancy in the Spanish case. Respondents largely agree that their organizational goals are clearly 
stated. But on questions related to transparency, whether organizational goals are clearly 
communicated to staff, and the number of goals their organization has, responses are contradictory.  
Interestingly, Spanish executives state they do not feel very autonomous in their work. Autonomy in 
Human Resources in particular is extremely low in the Spanish case, whilst budget allocation 
autonomy is also quite low. Questions on interaction frequency confirm the “silo culture” dominates 
the public sector in Spain, with little interaction with people outside the immediate work 
environment. On coordination, we saw how Spain continues to have a serious coordination deficit, 
and fragmentation remains a major concern. Moreover, the Spanish public sector remains quite 
highly politicised as regards appointment practices, continuing the traditional “spoils system” 
described by Nieto (1996).  
Spain embarked on a deep privatization movement, slowly under the Socialists in the 1980s but then 
dramatically under the PP in the 1990s. However, privatization affected industry and utilities in 
particular. Executives did not perceive privatization and agentification to have been very relevant in 
their sectors. More perceived that outsourcing was important, which makes sense, because this 
policy has been more prevalent in the sectors under study here. It is generally thought that public 
sector reform in Spain has been driven without public involvement, from the top-down. Only 10% 
thought reform has been successful, and nearly 32%, unsuccessful.  
One key goal of the present study is to obtain systematic information on how public sector 
executives assess the impact of the various public sector reforms on an organizational but also policy 
level. At the organizational level, managerial instruments are not highly relevant in the Spanish case. 
The main exception is the use of service points for customers. Infrequently used are performance 
related pay, risk management, decentralization of staffing decisions and so forth. This confirms the 
resistance of managerial reforms in the Spanish case. Neither are performance management tools 
perceived as being of great importance in Spain. When asked whether individuals use performance 
indicators when working, responses are so diverse it is difficult to obtain a clear picture on this 
question.  
Apart from central government, the survey also targeted more specifically the health and 
employment sectors. With regards to employment, results do not differ substantially from the rest of 
the Spanish sample. The major difference here is that executives in the employment sector consider 
giving voice to citizens as more important than the average Spanish perception. Regarding 
autonomy, employment executives feel they have even less than the already low levels perceived in 
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Spain, but they do state more strongly they feel rewarded for their achievements and that they use 
performance indicators more commonly.  
As regards the health sector, greater differences can be observed than in the employment sector 
with the average COCOPS results for Spain. Health executives feel that their provision of expertise 
and technical knowledge is more relevant than the overall sample, whilst they feel it is less relevant 
to focus on achieving results and getting public organizations to work together. This is logical given 
the different tasks of the employment and health sectors. Health executives perceive they have 
higher levels of autonomy than their peers in employment – again, this could be explained by the 
decentralization of health in Spain. It is perceived that corporatization, privatization and outsourcing 
are more prevalent in this sector than in the average survey results for Spain. Finally, management 
instruments such as customer surveys, internal steering by contract, benchmarking, decentralization 
of financial decisions and risk management are perceived to be more important in health than the 
average COCOPS responses.  
Overall, after several decades of NPM and privatization reforms around Europe, the results from 
Spanish executives suggest there is more continuity than change in the Spanish Public Administration 
system. Clearly, there are areas of exceptions: we saw how some NPM-style reforms in health are 
perceived as more relevant than in the rest of the public administration sector. We also saw how 
NPM reforms around the consumer seem to be perceived as more relevant than other reforms, such 
as performance related pay and so on. But as regards lack of mobility, inward looking ness, low levels 
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